When research seems like clinical care: a qualitative study of the communication of individual cancer genetic research results by Miller, Fiona A et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Medical Ethics
Open Access Research article
When research seems like clinical care: a qualitative study of the 
communication of individual cancer genetic research results
Fiona A Miller*1, Mita Giacomini2, Catherine Ahern3, Jason S Robert4 and 
Sonya de Laat3
Address: 1Department of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, 2Department of Clinical 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, 3Department of Health, Aging and Society, McMaster University, 
Hamilton, Canada and 4Department of Basic Medical Sciences, University of Arizona College of Medicine, Phoenix, USA
Email: Fiona A Miller* - fiona.miller@utoronto.ca; Mita Giacomini - giacomin@mcmaster.ca; Catherine Ahern - aherncm@mcmaster.ca; 
Jason S Robert - Jason-Robert@asu.edu; Sonya de Laat - delaat@mcmaster.ca
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: Research ethicists have recently declared a new ethical imperative: that researchers should
communicate the results of research to participants. For some analysts, the obligation is restricted to the
communication of the general findings or conclusions of the study. However, other analysts extend the
obligation to the disclosure of individual research results, especially where these results are perceived to
have clinical relevance. Several scholars have advanced cogent critiques of the putative obligation to
disclose individual research results. They question whether ethical goals are served by disclosure or
violated by non-disclosure, and whether the communication of research results respects ethically salient
differences between research practices and clinical care. Empirical data on these questions are limited.
Available evidence suggests, on the one hand, growing support for disclosure, and on the other, the
potential for significant harm.
Methods: This paper explores the implications of the disclosure of individual research results for the
relationship between research and clinical care through analysis of research-based cancer genetic testing
in Ontario, Canada in the late 1990s. We analyze a set of 30 interviews with key informants involved with
research-based cancer genetic testing before the publicly funded clinical service became available in 2000.
Results:  We advance three insights: First, the communication of individual research results makes
research practices seem like clinical services for our respondents. Second, while valuing the way in which
research enables a form of clinical access, our respondents experience these quasi-clinical services as
inadequate. Finally, our respondents recognize the ways in which their experience with these quasi-clinical
services is influenced by research imperatives, but understand and interpret the significance and
appropriateness of these influences in different ways.
Conclusion: Our findings suggest that the hybrid state created through the disclosure of research results
about individuals that are perceived to be clinically relevant may produce neither sufficiently adequate
clinical care nor sufficiently ethical research practices. These findings raise questions about the extent to
which research can, and should, be made to serve clinical purposes, and suggest the need for further
deliberation regarding any ethical obligation to communicate individual research results.
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Background
In recent years, policy makers and scholars concerned
with research ethics have declared a new ethical impera-
tive: that researchers should communicate the results of
research to participants [1,2]. For many commentators,
the obligation is restricted to the communication of the
general findings or conclusions of the study – aggregate
information about the sample of participants [1]. But for
others, the obligation is to disclose individual results,
especially where these results are perceived to have clinical
relevance. The obligation to disclose individual results is
argued most forcefully in the case of genetic test results in
genetic research (i.e., research-based genetic test results)
[3-6], but increasingly the obligation is suggested for
other types of clinical research, such as unblinding at the
conclusion of trials and the reporting of relevant individ-
ual-level clinical data to participants [7,8]. Reasons for
disclosure are many, with ethicists arguing that the princi-
ples of respect for persons, reciprocity, beneficience, and
justice require the offer of research results to research par-
ticipants. Yet several scholars have advanced cogent cri-
tiques questioning whether these principles are served by
disclosure or violated by non-disclosure, and whether the
communication of individual research results respects
ethically salient differences between research practices
and clinical care [9-13]. Empirical data on these questions
are limited and available studies are inconclusive. On the
one hand, studies regarding the preferences of research
participants and the practices of researchers suggest a
growing enthusiasm for the communication of aggregate
and individual results to participants [1,2,14-17]. On the
other hand, some research examining the experience of
individual result disclosure highlights the potential for
significant harm [18,19].
To date, advocates of the communication of research
results have focused on practices and policy in research
contexts. Yet clinical practices are also implicated by the
communication of research results that are perceived to
have clinical significance, especially research results about
individuals. This paper explores the relationship between
research and clinical care, and the implications of the dis-
closure of individual research results, through analysis of
research-based cancer genetic testing in Ontario, Canada
in the late 1990s. Drawing on interviews with partici-
pants, researchers, and other clinical providers, we gain
three crucial insights. First, the communication of
research results about individuals makes research prac-
tices seem like clinical services for participants (who iden-
tify themselves as 'patients'), researchers and other
clinicians. Second, while valuing the way in which
research enables a form of clinical access, our respondents
experience these quasi-clinical services as partially inade-
quate. They express concerns about excessive delays in the
receipt of research test results, the quality of research-
based testing, and the ability of researchers to act with suf-
ficient clinical sensitivity toward participants. Finally, our
respondents recognize the ways in which their experience
with these quasi-clinical services is influenced by research
imperatives, but they understand and interpret the signif-
icance and appropriateness of these influences in different
ways. In sum, our findings suggest that the hybrid state
created through the disclosure of research results about
individuals that are perceived to be clinically relevant may
produce neither sufficiently adequate clinical care nor suf-
ficiently ethical research practices. These findings raise
questions about the extent to which research can, and
should, be made to serve clinical purposes, and suggest the
need for further deliberation regarding any ethical obliga-
tion to communicate individual research results.
The case: research-based cancer genetic testing in 
Ontario, Canada
The genes associated with hereditary breast/ovarian and
colorectal cancers were identified in the early and mid-
1990s, with high expectations for their clinical utility.
Early estimates of the lifetime risk associated with delete-
rious mutations in these genes were developed through
study of limited numbers of very high risk families, and it
was clear to informed commentators that additional epi-
demiologic research was needed to clarify risks in these
and other populations [20]. In addition, it was not imme-
diately apparent whether any interventions would be
effective in reducing the risks that deleterious mutations
in these genes conferred. Viewing research to answer these
questions as both essential, and as a safer context in which
to provide cancer genetic testing, relevant professional
societies and other stakeholders advocated that cancer
genetic testing only be conducted within the context of
well designed research protocols [21,22]. Indeed, Frances
Visco of the National Breast Cancer Coalition in the US
argued in 1996 that, "Under existing circumstances,
genetic testing for breast cancer outside of quality research
protocols is harmful to your patients" [23]. This and other
commentary tacitly presumed that genetic test research
results would be disclosed to research participants.
In the US, the commercial imperative soon bypassed cau-
tious guidance, with commercial genetic testing becoming
available in 1996 [24]. In several other jurisdictions, how-
ever, research-based access to cancer genetic testing pre-
vailed through the 1990s [25,26]. In Ontario, for
example, access was limited to research protocols during
this time, with several large epidemiologic research stud-
ies making it possible for individuals to receive research-
based genetic test results regarding their risk for hereditary
breast/ovarian and colorectal cancer from the mid-1990s
on, at no cost to themselves. Two of these initiatives
involved Ontario-wide, population-based registries: a
familial breast and ovarian cancer registry, and a familialBMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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colorectal cancer registry [27,28]. A separate genetic epide-
miologic research initiative, focusing exclusively on famil-
ial breast/ovarian cancer, was based in Toronto, and
enrolled high-risk families [29,30]. It was not until April
2000 that full public funding for clinical cancer genetic
testing services (breast/ovarian and colorectal) was pro-
vided to Ontarians through the province's health insur-
ance program such that individuals could undergo cancer
genetic testing, at no cost to themselves, outside the con-
text of biomedical research [31].
Methods
The data for this paper are drawn from a study of the evo-
lution and organization of cancer genetics in Ontario,
Canada, that received ethics review from the McMaster
University Research Ethics Board. For the current project,
we analyzed a set of 30 interviews with 30 key informants
implicated in the delivery of research-based cancer genetic
testing before the publicly funded clinical service became
available (from a total of 83 interviews with 77 individu-
als for the project as a whole). Interviews were conducted
in 2004 and 2005 with the written informed consent of
the participant, and involved a retrospective discussion of
the period under review. To support an analysis that is
structured to address a bioethical debate concerning the
roles and responsibilities of researchers and participants,
we have classified our respondents into three categories:
researchers (N = 22), research participants (N = 4) and cli-
nicians (N = 4).
"Research participants" included in this analysis had
received research-based genetic testing through one or
several of the cancer genetic research studies discussed
above. We found it hard to identify individuals who had
been involved as research participants in the period under
review. Our study was independent of the cancer genetic
research discussed here so we could not make use of par-
ticipant lists from those studies. Further, as this paper
argues, the differences between research and clinical care
were not always obvious to research participants or health
care consumers: we know that several individuals we
interviewed (but not those reported here) did not appar-
ently pursue research-based testing, and we assume that
many who did gain access through research protocols did
not recognize themselves in our description of "research
participants". The individuals we recruited were those
who could be identified by relevant patient organizations
or through Internet searches. To facilitate recruitment, and
to minimize the risks of our research, our respondents
played some public role: they were active members of
patient support groups and some assumed the role of
patient advocate. Because of these roles we asked these
respondents to comment both on their personal experi-
ence with research-based access to genetic testing and on
their perception of the experience of other research partic-
ipants they counselled or worked with.
We classified individuals with varying degrees of respon-
sibility for the research under review as "researchers." This
includes scientists with no clinical role (e.g., laboratory
geneticists) and clinicians (e.g., surgeons, oncologists)
who were directly responsible for running relevant stud-
ies. This also includes clinicians (e.g., oncologists, clinical
geneticists, genetic counsellors, clinical laboratory person-
nel) whose research involvement was more limited,
including one or more of the following roles: (i) identifi-
cation as investigator in a research grant proposal, (ii)
membership on committees running relevant studies, (iii)
employment as research staff (i.e., genetic counsellors
employed to counsel research participants), (iv) involve-
ment through recruitment, assessment or related activity
with research participants, or supervision of clinical
research staff.
Finally, we classified respondents (e.g., clinical geneti-
cists) as "clinicians" where they did not assume responsi-
bility for research-based cancer genetic testing yet had
some connection to the relevant research studies (e.g.,
being co-located in centres where participants were
recruited) – sufficient to allow them to comment mean-
ingfully on what transpired.
The classification of research participants is straightfor-
ward, but the distinction drawn between clinicians and
researchers (a category that includes clinicians) is more
complex, reflecting the varied ways in which clinicians
operate as researchers. Many of the clinicians here identi-
fied as researchers were clinicians first and foremost, but
we have classified them as researchers for the purposes of
this analysis because of their assumption of clear respon-
sibilities in relevant research studies. Still, there are some
few clinicians whose limited role in the relevant research
renders their classification as researcher or clinician uncer-
tain. In particular, all those we classified as clinicians in
our sample had some engagement with the relevant
research, largely by working in close proximity to research
recruitment, and it is not always easy to decide whether
the occasional clinical engagement with a research partic-
ipant was subsequent to research participation, and thus a
form of clinical follow-up, or concurrent as, for example,
through the supervision of genetic counsellors who were
employed (in whole or in part) as research staff. Further,
some of those we classified as researchers played very sim-
ilar day-to-day roles as those classified as clinicians, with
a limited engagement with research participants and par-
tial involvement in the management of relevant studies.
In these few uncertain cases, we emphasized the degree of
formal responsibility for research that each individual had
assumed in making a final decision about classification.BMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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We analyzed the data using a mixture of case study and
modified grounded theory strategies [32-35]. As a case
study, we were interested in understanding the phenome-
non under study within its context, to analyze the data for
its fit with theoretical propositions, and to search actively
for contrary interpretations. In particular, we were inter-
ested in understanding whether the disclosure of research
results might have clinical implications. From grounded
theory we adopted the iterative and constant comparative
analytic method [34], but with a more reflexive, herme-
neutic approach to data interpretation [35]. Thus our cod-
ing strategy was mixed: we used a set of predetermined
codes developed from our interview guide and our review
of the literature to analyze the data, and also allowed
codes to emerge empirically from (or "grounded" in) the
data. We used qualitative data analysis software (NVivo,
version 7) to assist in the organization and categorization
of data. Interview transcripts were entered into our data-
base and coded by members of the research team (FAM,
CA and a research assistant). After reading each transcript
or document in whole, to gain insight into the context and
intent of the source, we then categorized the data into four
broad pre-structured themes, drawn from our interview
guide: the roles and beliefs of different health care provid-
ers; the connections between research and clinical service;
resource allocation processes and rationales; and, the
ways in which genetic service evolution in Ontario com-
pared with other services or jurisdictions. For this paper,
we focused our attention on data coded into the second
theme about the transition from research practices into
clinical care. While we asked respondents about this tran-
sition during the interviews, we did not systematically dis-
cuss the communication of research results; rather, this
was an emergent theme.
As a final analytic step, we distributed copies of a draft
manuscript to all cited respondents to ensure that we had
not accidentally breached confidentiality and to solicit
input on our interpretation of events. We received
detailed feedback from two respondents who sought to
clarify the operation and intention of the research studies,
and the views of research participants. The final analysis
presented here reflects the integration of these data and
viewpoints.
Results
Respondents discuss three main aspects of their involve-
ment with research-based access to cancer genetic testing
in Ontario. First, they clearly assume that genetic test
research results must be communicated to individual par-
ticipants as results become available during the course of
the study. At the same time, respondents suggest that test
result disclosure differentiates such studies from "pure"
research, because it requires adjunct clinical services and
entails clinical obligations among researchers, clinicians,
and participants. Second, respondents express some dis-
satisfaction with the quality of research-based testing as a
clinical service, and specify several ways in which such
testing fails to satisfy clinical imperatives. Finally,
respondents differ in their perceptions of how research
imperatives influence the operation of research-based
genetic testing. The informed consent process plays an
important role in revealing the research-nature of these
quasi-clinical practices. However, research priorities struc-
ture the terms and conditions of access to genetic test
results in subtle ways not always apparent to respondents.
Participants and researchers share these views, but they
sometimes emphasize different concerns, or describe
these concerns in ways that reflect their different stand-
points. Thus, in reviewing these three themes, we distin-
guish the parallel concerns of participants and researchers
within each theme. Where relevant, we discuss the con-
cerns of clinicians who were involved in associated clini-
cal care alongside those of researchers.
Theme 1: The communication of research results is 
expected, but disclosure makes research a quasi-clinical 
service
Respondents uniformly expect that research-based genetic
test results that are perceived to be clinically relevant will
be disclosed to individual participants. Yet these disclo-
sures prove to be complex interventions that blur the line
between research and clinical care, and create both clinical
opportunities and clinical obligations.
Researchers feel duty bound to communicate the results
of clinically relevant research test results to participants.
Yet this type of disclosure is also seen as shifting the role
of the study from "pure" research to clinical care.
How am I going to ask this person to my clinic and
provide me with a blood sample and family history
and just take that information and walk away and not
give them back anything? (Researcher45)
...and I mean in a true research setting I think the argu-
ment would have been made that, you know, the
results didn't necessarily go back to the participants in
the study ... (Researcher42)
The research test results are disclosed because researchers
perceive them to have clinical relevance. In turn, this clin-
ical relevance creates clinical responsibilities for research-
ers.
...the patients that were recruited for the study were
recruited for research. But from an ethical point of
view we have to show that if we found anything that
was of material interest to a patient that we had toBMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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have a system in place to provide service for that
patient. (Researcher20)
In many other areas of research it can easily just be
deemed as research and no immediate clinical impact,
but this was different. This was the clinical informa-
tion that we knew was useful, and data was emerging
continuously. [pause]... and it affected patients. We
had to deal with it. So even though it was research we
had to do a clinical service. (Researcher44)
It is clear to researchers that the research test results will
lead participants to make clinical decisions. In turn, these
clinical decisions generate clinical demands on providers
who are not directly involved in the research study.
The problem is that it is not pure research and it's not
a pure service; it is a combination. It has always been
from the beginning and that was one of our big prob-
lems ... This is definitely a service; women are taking
action based on these test results; some of them are
having their breasts removed, some of them are having
their ovaries removed, you know, we can't view it as
just research. (Clinician23)
I think we recognized that if, if a family participated in
the research study and did qualify for testing and did,
in fact, get results that we [clinical geneticists] would
be the people picking up the pieces. We'd be giving the
results and we'd be explaining the implications and
we'd be answering their questions about, well, "What
do I do with this information and how do I tell other
members of my family?" Those would all be pieces
that would essentially be clinical service. (Clinician3)
Participants expect to learn their research test results.
Indeed, the individuals we interviewed participated in the
research  in order to get such information (although
researchers informed us that not all participants wished to
receive their genetic test results). Participants acknowl-
edge that receiving research test results blurs distinctions
between research and clinical care, but they dismiss such
distinctions as unimportant given their desire for clini-
cally relevant information.
... and so this was a blurred line because they had said
that we would get a result from it but it was also a
research protocol we were contributing to. So it was
blurry. (Participant58)
And I realized that, you know, that there was this
funny line that had been crossed and you know it was
research and ah ... But when you're a patient in your,
in the midst of all this, really you don't really give a
damn. Your blood is sitting up there, you've been wait-
ing for four months! You know? And it's like dangling
a carrot in front of a horse. (Participant49)
Theme 2. The research context limits the quality of the 
'service' that is provided
The provision of research test results that are perceived to
have clinical relevance changes the dynamics of research,
creating clinical options for participants and clinical obli-
gations both for the researchers and for clinicians outside
the research study. Respondents express broad support for
the clinical opportunities created, but they express con-
cern about the quality of the clinical services provided
under research auspices.
Researchers view service limitations as inherent in the use
of research funds for the provision of clinical care, creating
a classic quandary: the research cannot proceed without
attending to clinical needs, but these needs cannot be fully
addressed within the research context.
... questions raised about using research dollars to pro-
vide what some people perceived as being a diagnostic
service and not really having sufficient funding to run
it as a true service. So that caused some tensions at the
consumer end of things. (Researcher42)
So it's one of those, it's a catch 22 situation, right? If
you just do the research and offer no clinical feedback
then people are upset about that, and if you do both
and provide some clinical feedback people get upset
that it's not a full-fledged clinical program, right?
(Researcher45)
Researchers also express concern about the quality of
research-based genetic testing. Complaints about the
timely provision of genetic test research results are fre-
quent, as is concern about the accuracy and reliability of
these delayed results where produced in research, rather
than clinical, laboratories. Further, researchers are unsure
about the ability of some researchers to provide these
effectively clinical services – to meet patient expectations
for the sensitive provision of care.
A research lab [test quality] is less important. They
have 100 samples, they care that 4% of the samples
had mutations. They don't care that John Doe and
Mrs. Jane Smith had a mutation. That's secondary to
them. Whereas the clinical labs, that's what they're
programmed to do, to deliver the right results to the
right patient. (Researcher21)
[The researcher] was supervising the dissemination of
results by mail. But I don't think [the researcher] had
the best handle on how, although this was initially
research ... and the patients didn't get results for yearsBMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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and years, eventually they did. I think it was set up,
you know, as a molecular biology research project
rather than something that was, in fact, going to
become a provincial service. From the patient's end it
was very much seen as a service. There was this dichot-
omy. (Researcher21)
For participants, the quality of clinical service provided
through research protocols is also a concern, but different
issues are emphasized. Like researchers, participants seem
concerned about the limited access to research-based clin-
ical services, and more specifically, the slowness of
research test results and the poor bedside manner of some
researchers acting in a quasi-clinical capacity. Unlike
researchers, however, participants appear not to be aware
of the risks to test quality created by the use of research
laboratories.
I felt it should have been a service. No it wasn't. I
didn't feel it was a service. I knew that it was research.
It's just that as we waited and waited ... it was research
with such clear application for us... (Participant58)
Probably, if you're involved in research, that is going
to be your area of expertise, then that is what you're
going to do best, and although you might try to give
other services you're not going to be as good at it....
[The researcher] answered all the questions and all of
that, it's just that when you're dealing with a genetic
disorder or disease, or probability, it's very personal. It
is as personal as it gets. And you do need that little bit
of kid glove care, and that tender loving care, and you
don't usually get that from researchers.
(Participant56)
Theme 3. Research provision of genetic test results remains 
research in morally salient ways
The research-based provision of genetic testing necessarily
involves the provision of clinical care, however limited in
quality. But even when research-based genetic testing
addresses clinical needs it remains responsive to research
imperatives. Research asks specific questions that may or
may not match a patient's clinical questions, and answers
them in accordance with its own timeframe and goals.
Clinical services may be important, even essential ele-
ments of the research project, but the scope of these clini-
cal services is determined by research priorities. For
example, eligibility criteria for research-based genetic test-
ing follow the parameters of a desired sample or study
population, and not the requests of patients or their phy-
sicians. Participants do not generally anticipate such lim-
its, which only come into focus when they encounter
specific barriers or opportunities. Further, research partic-
ipation imposes burdens, creating additional work for
researchers and demanding time and energy from partici-
pants. In this context, the provision of test results serves an
important research imperative: compensation and
inducement for participation. The provision of research
results offers a way of 'giving back' to participants for the
contributions they make, and burdens they endure. It also
serves as an important – even undue – inducement for
research participation.
For researchers, the demands of research supersede those
of clinical care. Where research questions suggest the need
for different eligibility criteria than those required to meet
clinical needs, the former are prioritized. Thus, research
eligibility criteria sometimes rule out clinically needy
cases. Conversely, research protocols sometimes make
access easier for less clinically needy participants, as
researchers pursue 'interesting cases' in lieu of needs-
based clinical triage.
Respondent: Research works at its own pace, right?
Because again, they have their vested interest in what
they're looking for and what they are doing.
Interviewer: What do you mean?
Respondent: Well, they have a certain, they have a
research project, whatever it may be, and somebody is
providing the blood samples, yes? They're hoping that
genetic testing is going to be completed at some point
in time [....] so, depending on what their projects are,
there might be priorities for who should get tested
when. They might have an interest in, let's say, Jewish
women with breast cancer, Jewish women with ovar-
ian cancer, and those samples are going to get tested
first, and everyone else is going to wait. So that's what
I mean, like, there is a vested interest in it. They're
looking at what interests them, and those samples are
then going to be potentially processed sooner than
others. So, whereas with a service test, it works a little
bit differently. I mean, your sample goes in and it gets
tested and there is a turn around time and you expect
to get results in. (Researcher10)
For researchers, the need to apply complex eligibility cri-
teria for access to research-based testing is one of the bur-
dens of research participation. Together with the need for
research data from participants (e.g., the completion of
family history questionnaires, etc.), and the requirement
for written informed consent, the application of eligibility
criteria increases the workload for front line researchers,
and is perceived to be burdensome for research partici-
pants, making additional demands on time and energy.
... and it [the existence of the clinical service] almost
relieves us of the burden we have, because the research
seemed to be kind of finicky. There was, you know, theBMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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eligibility criteria and then if this, then this, you know,
you had to have a... I remember starting this. I had to
have a flow chart; several flow charts. (Researcher33)
It's [clinical service access] less of a hassle for them
[patients] because they're not part of a study and
doing fifteen questionnaires before they get to a
genetic counselling appointment. It's more like a, it's
part of medical care rather than off at the side [....] I
would imagine that it might seem a little more reassur-
ing and a little more, trustworthy is not quite the right
word, but because it's more of a part of the medical
community rather than this research, we're going to
send blood to Toronto, you've got to do some ques-
tionnaires. (Researcher7)
Researchers view access to research-based test results as
one form of compensation to participants for the burdens
of participation (others include, for example, clinical
assessments of genetic risk). The potential receipt of
research results is also an inducement for participation
and is believed to improve participation rates.
Historically, I mean, historically up until, you know,
the advent of Myriad and certainly before the estab-
lishment of the clinical program, we were kind of
really the only game in Ontario – if you were a person
who wanted a test for BRCA 1&2 [....] So, you know,
we needed to have people participate, and then to
have various people participating we would offer to
share the results that we would get from our research
with them, though we couldn't guarantee we could
have their result in three months or six months,
because that's the way research goes. (Researcher45)
... the patients did two questionnaires in the study and
now it was sort of like, "Well, you do this for us and
we'll do this for you." Like the testing and, you know,
"We've done testing and you're going to also help us
out with this study." (Researcher14)
Despite the offer of information as an inducement, and
participants' motivation for information, researchers
stress the importance of an explicit consent process to
make clear that the research "contract" does not guarantee
the participant timely access to research test results.
I think they tend to, I think, tended to deal with it
quite well. It is also all in how you explain it. Some-
body's giving a sample for research. There are no guar-
antees that a result is ever going to come out of it. And
as long you explain it to people so that they under-
stand what the situation is, they are giving informed
consent. And then you would presume that they
would realize that their results can take up to, you
know, one or two years. (Researcher10)
Well the [research study] was trying to offer testing to
the people who participated in that study but it was
supposed to be made clear to those people that it was
research testing that was being offered to them.... some
people may have misunderstood that, you know
[thinking] it was a test that they were, that they were
going to definitely get, maybe [in] a certain time frame
– versus a research test that could take a long time to
develop, over time. (Researcher25)
The participants we spoke to indicate their own awareness
of the differences between research and clinical care, but
some express concern that others might not share this
awareness, or care about its implications. Further, partici-
pants perceive the influence of research imperatives rather
differently than researchers. Instead of highlighting the
burdens of participation, or the role of research priorities
in determining access to research-based genetic testing,
participants point to more subtle ways in which they per-
ceive their involvement in research to be valued, or not.
Participants seeking access to the clinical aspects of cancer
genetic research projects are unsure that the research
nature of such studies is consistently clear.
... see, that's where the confusion came for me and I
was so surprised. I don't remember them identifying it
as a research project to begin with. Never was it iden-
tified as a research project. Seriously. (Participant49)
[NB: this respondent later identified an awareness of
the research nature of the project]
But I think probably most, most people wouldn't
make that distinction. They would think that they're
getting the service and they wouldn't really think of
themselves as being part of a research project, cause
that's sort of going on in the background. You don't
see that part of it. You kind of just see the service and
maybe it's not always made that, you know, always
made clear enough. I don't know. Or whether it would
make a difference to some people that's also a ques-
tion. It certainly wouldn't have made any difference to
me, one way or the other. (Participant56)
The influence of research priorities on the terms and con-
ditions of access to research based genetic testing is sug-
gested by two participants. One views research as more
flexible, improving her ability to gain access, while
another sees research as restrictive, reducing her access to
test results.BMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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They were willing to take my blood on the basis that it
was research and I think that, probably, they were able
to be more flexible as a result. I don't know. That's
how it came across to me. (Participant61)
... there were delays with the research protocols. We
were caught in a research, so they couldn't prioritize,
for instance, the blood of someone like me.
(Participant58)
In addition to the direct influence of research priorities on
access, some participants express a sense of being insuffi-
ciently valued through the research process – as if they
were ignored, or treated as a means to an end.
You don't get information ... "We thought we would
tell you what's going on in our research study ..." If we
want to find it we have to look it up on the Internet.
(Participant56)
...and then once you were in the research protocol it
was like, you didn't exist as a patient anymore. They
were obviously going to get back to you with a test
result whenever ... (Participant58)
Finally, one participant wonders whether the inducement
to participation created by the offer of research test results
undermines truly voluntary participation.
So, you know, to only be able to get it through a
research protocol, number one meant that, in a sense,
you have to participate in the research. And I'm not
anti-research .... But I think we have to be really careful
with people when it's, when we're asking them to par-
ticipate in something that benefits us, sort of profes-
sionally, and in other ways, you know? ... In essence,
you're sort of forced into the research at times. This
was a case in which there was no other way to get
access to that test except to participate in research. So
how could, what kind of choice is there really?
(Participant58)
Discussion
The technological capacity to identify mutations in the
genes associated with hereditary cancer arose long before
clarity existed about the epidemiological significance of
these mutations in populations, or the clinical utility of
obtaining advance information about these genetic risks
in individuals. In Ontario and many other jurisdictions,
research has been perceived to be the best way to manage
this uncertainty as it allows a controlled and safe environ-
ment within which individuals might learn of their
genetic risks and enables the collection of rigorous data to
fill knowledge gaps. This sensibility, and historical pattern
of practice, aligns well with emerging arguments in
research ethics, which suggest that researchers have an
ethical duty to disclose the individually-relevant results of
genetic and other biomedical tests conducted under the
auspices of research studies to research participants, espe-
cially where these results are perceived to have clinical sig-
nificance. Yet the findings presented here give some cause
for concern about a generalized ethical obligation to dis-
close individual research test results.
This study demonstrates that the disclosure of individual
research test results can make cancer genetic research seem
like clinical care, thereby creating unrealistic expectations
as well as inadequate clinical service. Both researchers and
participants recognize the distinction between research
and clinical care, but the disclosure of individuals' test
results blurs the line separating these domains. Research
participants see themselves as "patients," first and fore-
most, and those who seek research test results do so with
the clear intention to use these results to inform their
own, or their families', cancer risk assessment and man-
agement (e.g., screening, prophylactic surgery, etc.).
Researchers feel that test result disclosure alters the com-
plexion of the research endeavor, making it something
other than "pure" research. The entailed clinical obliga-
tions fall both on researchers and clinicians actively
involved in the research projects, and on clinicians caring
for the participants but not involved in the research.
Test result disclosure transforms research into a quasi-
clinical service, but participants and researchers express
concerns about the quality of the clinical service that can
be provided under research auspices. The quality of – and
access to – the service is inevitably compromised by the
reliance upon limited research funds. While convinced of
the need for these quasi-clinical services, respondents are
dismayed by the amount of time it takes to get a test result,
and researchers also express concern about potential qual-
ity problems with testing conducted in research laborato-
ries. Further, participants and researchers express some
concern about the ability of researchers to act with suffi-
cient clinical sensitivity toward those seeking research test
results.
Alongside quality limitations, the quasi-clinical services
provided under research auspices are constrained by
research imperatives that take priority over the objectives
of individual clinical care. The views of participants and
researchers largely agree here. Both participants and
researchers are aware of an implicit contract in which
research participation, and the burdens that it imposes,
are exchanged for research test results. Yet the ways in
which the demands of research structure the terms and
conditions of access are not consistently visible to our
respondents. Participants understand the distinction
between research and clinical care, and know that theyBMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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have been involved in research (though some wonder
whether others would be so informed). But not all partic-
ipants understand that their own access to research test
results is conditioned by research priorities. Further, while
participants do not discuss the general burdens of research
participation – in contrast with researchers – they express
concerns about how their participation is, or is not, valued
over time. Finally, participants do not share the concerns
of researchers regarding the potential for reduced accuracy
and reliability of test results generated in research labora-
tories.
Much of the evidence gathered by other studies regarding
the communication of research test results has revealed
that participants generally want to receive either general
research findings [15,17,36-38] or more individual
research test results [14,16]. Indeed, because participants
see themselves as contributing to research, they feel enti-
tled to research test results in return [15]. While most
researchers are willing to provide results to participants,
many are concerned about the practical challenges of
doing so [7,39,40]. Our study affirms the existence of par-
ticipants' preferences to know, and researchers' general
desire to meet these preferences. At the same time, a
smaller body of work that investigates the meaning of
result disclosure more qualitatively suggests that the com-
munication of individual research test results is no simple
add-on, but rather a complex, and potentially hazardous,
intervention [18,19]. Paradoxically, our study affirms this
finding as well.
Might the quasi-clinical services provided under research
auspices ever be adequate? In Ontario, it is clear that can-
cer genetic test results provided through research proto-
cols are often not up to prevailing clinical expectations of
either timeliness or appropriateness of care. The degree of
compromise may be specific to the case under study. In
any event, proponents of the duty to disclose research test
results have advanced a number of proposals that could
improve service adequacy. In particular, steps might be
taken to ensure the quality of the genetic test results that
are disclosed to research participants [6], and sufficient
clinical expertise could be made available to researchers
so that participants can be treated with clinical sensitivity
[5]. Further, research funders might provide sufficient
monies to ensure that test result disclosure can be per-
formed in a clinically adequate manner [41]. For example,
additional funds might allow researchers to achieve a
faster turn around time for research test results. These pro-
posed remedies might solve several of the challenges of
result disclosure identified in this case study.
However, not all of the concerns about the quality of the
clinical services provided under research auspices are
equally remediable. These quasi-clinical services will inev-
itably be driven by research priorities, and in some cases
these will conflict with clinical imperatives. In particular,
access to tests is determined by study sampling protocols,
not by the priorities of clinical triage or fairness that
should normally determine access to health services. For
example, genetic epidemiological research may be organ-
ized to assess mutation prevalence in particular ethnic
populations, making research unable to address the need
for a test result in an individual outside that ethnic group.
Individuals who seek testing may not be eligible to enroll
in the necessary study, or once enrolled, may find them-
selves in a low priority group for timely results.
Even where clinical services in the research setting appear
adequate, do the associated research practices remain eth-
ically sound? A first concern involves the appropriateness
of the reciprocity implicit in test result disclosure. As is
apparent from our respondents' comments, and from lit-
erature on the duty to disclose, it is clear that the provision
of research test results is seen as a form of recompense,
whereby researchers "give back" to participants in recogni-
tion of their contributions to the research study. While
many of our respondents view this reciprocity as appro-
priate, one participant feels it compromises the voluntari-
ness of research participation. In the absence of parallel
clinical access to these tests, this respondent views
research participation as a requirement to gain access to
testing [42]. Further, ethicists promoting the disclosure of
research test results to participants see the communication
of results as a way to demonstrate respect for research par-
ticipants as full persons – to treat these persons as an end
in themselves, rather than as means to an end [1]. Yet
despite the promise of test result disclosure, some partici-
pants remain concerned about being insufficiently valued
– even "used" by researchers as a means to an end. Test
result disclosure is an unlikely remedy for participant
alienation. While reciprocity is called for in research, it is
not clear why individual test results might be the only, or
best, gift to exchange.
An additional threat to research ethics in result disclosure
arises from the therapeutic misconception [43,44]. This
misconception occurs when participants fail to recognize
the essential differences between the goals of research and
the goals of clinical care, leading them to either, (1)
believe that their own therapeutic needs will be met
through a research protocol, or (2) ignore or fail to recog-
nize the risks of research participation. Under the miscon-
ception of therapeutic value, participants provide
inadequately informed consent. The therapeutic miscon-
ception can also affect researchers, leading them to mis-
identify their role and to believe that their actions toward
research participants are necessarily in the participants'
clinical best interests[45].BMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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Whether a therapeutic misconception exists where genetic
research test results are disclosed depends largely on
whether the risks entailed by the test information are
downplayed. This study provides several reasons for
believing that they may be. Participants seem unaware of
researcher concerns about the quality of test results from
research laboratories. They also seem inconsistently aware
of how research priorities determine access, or timely
access, to test results. Further, none of our respondents
(participants or researchers) question the clinical signifi-
cance of these investigational test results. This confident
consensus is somewhat surprising. By the latter half of the
1990s, cancer genetic test results were known to identify
clinically important risks. But the epidemiological
research occurring in Ontario and elsewhere at this time
was designed to clarify the risks arising from varied muta-
tions in different populations, and to evaluate the clinical
benefits of prophylactic interventions. Though not without
clinical importance, we might expect respondents to
express some uncertainty about the precise meaning and
value of these investigational genetic test results.
The assessment of clinical importance is relevant to the
threat of the therapeutic misconception: the clinical value
of investigational test results might be overplayed and
participants misled. But the challenges arising in the
assessment of clinical significance extend beyond this spe-
cific threat to the nature of the adjudication process itself.
What does determine clinical significance? Does the con-
current availability of commercial cancer genetic testing
render research-based genetic test results "clinically signif-
icant"? And which authorities – patient organizations,
coverage decision-makers, expert consensus groups, com-
mercial providers, research teams – are empowered to
make such a judgment? As we have argued elsewhere, the
distinction that many ethicists have promoted in specify-
ing the obligation to disclose research results – between
definitive/validated and preliminary/unvalidated results
[3-5] – is almost impossible to define and apply. It is one
of the fundamental conceptual uncertainties complicating
the putative obligation to disclose [46]. In the absence of
clear adjudications or adjudication processes, judgments
about the existence or degree of clinical importance are
likely to be profoundly influenced by the contexts in
which such judgments are made – with the possibility that
judgments will be influenced by the clinical feel  of
research practices.
This study faces several limitations. We interviewed a
small number of research participants and asked all
respondents to recall practices during a time period
approximately 5 years earlier. Our data do not permit us
to fully explore considerable heterogeneity within the cat-
egories of "participant," "researcher," and "clinician," and
important differences between specific research studies,
and within research studies over time. We know that
many "researchers" identify themselves as clinicians first
and foremost, but we have categorized them as "research-
ers" because of their formal involvement with the studies
under review. We also know that not all "participants"
were involved in the same studies, or participated in the
same way: some were offered research-based genetic test-
ing when they sought an assessment of their risk status at
a familial cancer clinic, while others deliberately sought
access to research-based genetic testing. Still other partici-
pants (though none of those interviewed by us) would
have been contacted by a provincial cancer registry and
offered research-based genetic testing, either because of
familial risk or to serve as healthy "controls". Further, as
individuals with public roles, the research participants we
interviewed are not typical and their reflections on what
other participants might experience or believe must be
approached with caution.
However, these limitations do not detract from our con-
clusion that further consideration should be given regard-
ing any ethical obligation to offer individual research
results to research participants. As it has been advanced to
date, this putative ethical obligation faces surprisingly few
conditions. Most guidance makes clear that researchers
should offer individual test results on a voluntary basis
[1,5]. While this voluntarism is necessary, it may not be
sufficient. Voluntarism cannot, after all, ensure that the
offer of results does not serve as undue inducement to par-
ticipate in research in the first instance. Further, as Parker
notes, the offer of disclosure carries with it the "suggestion
that one would be imprudent to refuse" [10]. Finally,
while some commentators argue that all individual
research test results should be offered to participants
[8,47], most argue that results must meet some standard
of reliability or significance [3-5]. Yet in the absence of
clear and objective standards of clinical significance –
standards that are often unavailable – the requirement of
"clinical significance" as the trigger of an ethical obliga-
tion to disclose may prove idiosyncratic and thus morally
suspect – responding to the contexts in which such judg-
ments are made rather than the substantive elements of
clinical validity and utility.
Beyond the constraints of voluntarism and test result sig-
nificance it is assumed that disclosure is ethically merito-
rious. But what is required to gain these benefits, and can
they invariably be achieved? Must research policy be
altered to ensure that research projects that involve indi-
vidual result disclosure also ensure that this clinical infor-
mation is given in the context of a high quality clinical
service? If not, do the partial and potentially limited clin-
ical services that can be provided in typical research set-
tings exacerbate participant alienation, and cause possible
harm? The issues extend beyond the adequacy of the clin-BMC Medical Ethics 2008, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/9/4
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ical services provided under research auspices to the ethics
of the research itself. Our findings suggest that the clinical
sensibility that prevails where clinically relevant research
test results are disclosed may in fact create therapeutic
misconceptions. Researchers may find it difficult to act
ethically in seeking informed participation when result
disclosure is seen as the reciprocal gift. And persons who
participate in order to get individual research results may
never provide fully informed consent. Finally, research
may prove unable to fulfill its evaluative function where it
is so pervasively viewed as the source of a clinically useful
commodity.
Conclusion
It is not our intention to cast doubt on the excellence of
the goals or operation of the cancer genetic research stud-
ies considered here. These studies established much of the
clinical expertise and institutional capacity for the clinical
services that were subsequently developed in Ontario.
They contributed essential knowledge about the epidemi-
ology of mutations predisposing to cancer, and they sig-
nificantly advanced knowledge about appropriate ways to
manage inherited cancer risks. It is precisely because these
studies were both well conducted and necessary that we
need ask whether they (and others like them) should also
serve clinical goals.
Further, in calling into question the obligation to commu-
nicate individual research results to research participants
we are not advocating a return to a more paternalistic era
when experts withheld vital information. Nor do we chal-
lenge ethical obligations to respect and value the contri-
butions of research participants. Rather, we question
whether individual research results are the appropriate
token of that valuation, and whether the up-front "con-
tract" with research participants should always involve the
offer of individual research results. In our view, the rou-
tine disclosure of individual research results that are per-
ceived to be clinically relevant blurs an ethically
important distinction between research and clinical care
[9-13]. Disclosure could deceive or unduly induce the
involvement of research participants; it could also hasten
the adoption of clinically unproven health technologies.
Paradoxically, institutionalized testing through research
protocols may delay the introduction of clinical services
for reasons other than lack of evidence – as has been sug-
gested to us with respect to the cancer genetic research
studies in Ontario.
As we have argued elsewhere [46], there is a clear need for
more debate and conceptual development regarding any
obligation to disclose individual research results to
research participants. Disclosure can be ethically appro-
priate, even essential, under the right circumstances. But
more evidence and conceptual development is needed to
consider both the full range of implications suggested
here, and to identify morally salient differences in the
research and clinical contexts through which researchers
provide, and participants seek or gain access to, individual
research results.
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